Quadratic Voting with Smart Contracts – 智能合约二次投票区块链毕设代写

区块链毕设代写本文提供国外最新区块链项目源码下载,包括solidity,eth,fabric等blockchain区块链,Quadratic Voting with Smart Contracts – 智能合约二次投票区块链毕设代写 是一篇很好的国外资料

Quadratic Voting with Smart Contracts

QV Voting on the Ethereum Blockchain via a Smart Contract

Fell free to use this repository for anything you want. The code is free as in beer, and I require no attribution. I highly appreciate suggestions and you can contact me via the issues page.

Quick Overview

Notice in the picture below that to cast 5 votes you have to spend 25 Credits.

Quadratic Voting with Smart Contracts - 智能合约二次投票

from Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society!

So 1 credit gives you 1 vote, 4 credits gives you 2 votes, 9 credits – 3 votes and so on. Why is this important ? Checkout the explanation section

Process

Usually a KYC (or by using some electronic SSN, employees id etc), each person is give PERIODICALLY a number of tokens. They can keep it, or spend it to vote for the issues they care about. Everything is tracked at blockchain level (usually a private one).

Quadratic Voting with Smart Contracts - 智能合约二次投票 Picture by https://twitter.com/eximchainexc?lang=en

Learn more about QV Voting

Collective decision making using a majority rule of 50+1 is a standard procedure used by many firms and countries to decide whether a policy should be implemented. However, this mechanism is subject to the “tiranny of the majority” and therefore may give rise to situations that deviate the collective decision-making process from optimality (Posner and Weyl, 2014). Consider for instance a minority that care much more intensely about getting a public good (e.g. a road or a anti-discrimination law) than the majority does for the opposite outcome. With the use of a simple majoritarian rule it might be the case that the losses caused to the majority are greater than the benefits provided to the majority, an inefficient outcome from an utilitarian point of view. More generally, take a binary collective decision with a distribution of preferences such that preferring one of the choices is represented by a positive valuation whereas preferring the complementary choice is represented by a negative valuation. A majority voting system will lead to an inefficient outcome when the expected value and the median value are on opposite sides of the valuation space.

The Quadratic Voting mechanism (henceforth QV) proposed by Weyl (2013) is a novel electoral design which can yield more efficient outcomes than a majority voting system in these situations. Under the QV mechanism individuals buy votes at a quadratic unit cost and receive a reimbursement equal to the average of the others’ expenditures in votes. Hence, the marginal cost of an additional vote is proportional to the votes already purchased, and the marginal benefit of an additional vote is proportional to the cardinal value of changing the policy. Furthermore, because individuals receive a reimbursement equal to the average of others’ payment, the mechanism is budget balanced. In addition, QV tries to resolve other problems of mechanism design such as the collusion problem of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, and the information problems of the Expected Externality mechanism, where a social planner needs to know the distribution of the valuations that agents have.

you can read more here: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/974c/ee1137b4a56372af58772a88361b3ff4b9d6.pdf

According to its authors Steven P. Lalley and E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic voting is claimed to achieve the greatest possible good for the greatest number of group members, although other proponents of Quadratic Voting state that this is only true approximately. It addresses issues of voting paradox and majority-rule.

Based on market principles, each voter is endowed with a budget of “voice credits” that they may spend influencing the outcome of a range of decisions. If a participant has a strong preference for or against a particular decision, additional votes can be allocated. A vote pricing rule determines the cost of additional votes, whereby each vote increasingly becomes more expensive.

The quadratic nature of the voting means that a voter can use his or her votes more efficiently spread across many issues. For example, a voter with a budget of 16 vote credits can apply 1 vote credit to each of 16 issues. However, if they feel strongly about a single issue, they can apply 4 votes at the cost of 16 credits to a single issue. This will use their entire budget. This also means there is a large incentive to buy and sell votes, although using a strictly secret ballot gives some protection against vote buying as the purchase cannot be verified.

Contributing

Please read CONTRIBUTING.md for details on our code of conduct, and the process for submitting pull requests to us.

License

This project is licensed under the MIT License – see the LICENSE.md file for details


使用智能合约进行二次投票

通过智能合约在以太坊eth区块链blockchain上进行QV投票

您可以随意使用此存储库进行任何操作。代码就像啤酒一样免费,我不需要属性。我非常感谢您的建议,您可以通过问题页面与我联系。

快速概述

请注意,在下面的图片中,要投5票,您必须花费25个学分。

Quadratic Voting with Smart Contracts - 智能合约二次投票

来自激进市场:为一个公正的社会根除资本主义和民主!

所以1个学分给你1票,4个学分给你2票,9个学分-3票,依此类推。为什么这很重要?检查解释部分

过程

通常是一个KYC(或通过使用一些电子SSN、员工id等),每个人都会定期得到一些代币。他们可以保留它,或者花它来投票支持他们关心的问题。一切都在区块链blockchain层面进行跟踪(通常是私有的)。

Quadratic Voting with Smart Contracts - 智能合约二次投票图片作者https://twitter.com/eximchainexc?lang=en

了解有关QV投票的更多信息

使用50+1多数规则的集体决策是许多公司和国家用来决定是否应实施政策的标准程序。然而,这种机制受制于“多数人的疲劳”,因此可能会导致集体决策过程偏离最优的情况(波斯纳和韦尔,2014)。举个例子,少数人比多数人更关心获得公共利益(例如道路或反歧视法),而不是相反的结果。使用一个简单的多数主义规则,可能会出现这样的情况:给多数人造成的损失大于给多数人带来的利益,从功利主义的角度来看,这是一个低效的结果。更一般地说,采取一种二元集体决策,其偏好分布如下:偏好其中一种选择以正估值表示,而偏好互补选择以负估值表示。当期望值和中间值位于估值空间的对立面时,多数投票制将导致效率低下的结果。

Weyl(2013)提出的二次投票机制(以下简称QV)是一种新颖的选举设计,在这种情况下,它可以产生比多数投票系统更有效的结果。在QV机制下,个人以二次单位成本购买选票,得到的补偿等于其他人在选票上的平均支出。因此,额外投票的边际成本与已经购买的选票成正比,额外投票的边际收益与改变政策的基本价值成正比。此外,由于个人得到的补偿等于其他人的平均付款额,因此这一机制是预算平衡的。此外,QV试图解决机制设计的其他问题,如Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)机制的合谋问题,以及预期外部性机制的信息问题,其中社会规划者需要知道代理人的估值分布。

您可以在这里阅读更多内容:https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/974c/ee1137b4a56372af58772a88361b3ff4b9d6.pdf

根据其作者Steven p.Lalley和E.Glen Weyl的说法,二次投票被认为能为最大数量的群体成员带来最大可能的好处,尽管二次投票的其他支持者表示,这只是近似真实的。它解决了投票悖论和多数规则的问题。

根据市场原则,每个投票人都有一个“发言权”预算,他们可能会花在影响一系列决定的结果上。如果参与者对某一特定决策有强烈的偏好或反对,则可以分配额外的投票。投票定价规则决定了额外投票的成本,因此每次投票的成本越来越高。

投票的二次性意味着投票人可以更有效地利用他或她的选票来解决许多问题。例如,预算为16张选票的选民可以对16个问题中的每一个申请1张选票。但是,如果他们对一个问题有强烈的感觉,他们可以在一个问题上以16个学分的代价投4票。这将使用他们的全部预算。这也意味着买卖选票有很大的动机,尽管使用严格的无记名投票可以在一定程度上防止购买选票,因为购买选票无法核实。

贡献

请阅读贡献.md有关我们的行为准则以及向我们提交请求的过程的详细信息。

许可证

此项目是根据麻省理工学院许可证授权的-请参阅许可证.md文件以获取详细信息

部分转自网络,侵权联系删除区块链源码网

www.interchains.cc

https://www.interchains.cc/20314.html

区块链毕设网(www.interchains.cc)全网最靠谱的原创区块链毕设代做网站 部分资料来自网络,侵权联系删除! 最全最大的区块链源码站 ! QQ3039046426
区块链知识分享网, 以太坊dapp资源网, 区块链教程, fabric教程下载, 区块链书籍下载, 区块链资料下载, 区块链视频教程下载, 区块链基础教程, 区块链入门教程, 区块链资源 » Quadratic Voting with Smart Contracts – 智能合约二次投票区块链毕设代写

提供最优质的资源集合

立即查看 了解详情